In this paper, we focus on a novel technique called the cube-linear attack, which is formed by combining cube attacks with linear attacks. It is designed to recover the secret information in a probabilistic polynomial and can reduce the data complexity required for a successful attack in specific circumstances. In addition to the different combination strategies of the two attacks, two cube-linear schemes are discussed. Applying our method of a cube-linear attack to a reduced-round Trivium, as an example, we get better linear cryptanalysis results. More importantly, we believe that the improved linear cryptanalysis technique introduced in this paper can be extended to other ciphers.
I. Introduction
Linear cryptanalysis is an effective known-plaintext attack (KPA) against block ciphers. At present, KPA has been adapted to stream ciphers [1] - [5] . M. Matsui and A. Yamagishi [6] , in 1992, introduced the idea of linear cryptanalysis in an attack on FEAL [7] . The techniques used in this attack were refined by M. Matsui and had a dramatic effect on the Data Encryption Standard (DES). This eventually led to the first experimental cryptanalysis of the cipher being reported in the open community [8] - [9] .
Subsequently, several refinements to the basic idea of linear cryptanalysis have been suggested to improve the efficiency of the attacks it envelops, either in specific circumstances or in all cases. In 1994, B.S. Kaliski and M.J.B. Robshaw [10] proposed an extension to linear cryptanalysis based on the use of multiple linear approximations. S.K. Langford and M.E. Hellman [11] , in 1994, introduced the differential-linear attack, which is a mix of both differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. In 1996, L.R. Kundsen and M.J.B. Robshaw [12] introduced the idea of extending M. Matsui's linear cryptanalytic techniques to more general cases in which nonlinear relations are also considered. In [13] , zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis, the counterpart of impossible differential cryptanalysis in the domain of linear cryptanalysis, was proposed by A. Bogdanov and V. Rijmen, resulting in a faster attack for some ciphers.
Motivation and Contribution
As introduced above, there have been several extensions to linear cryptanalysis at present. Nevertheless, is there any available information not yet exploited by previous linear cryptanalysis methods ? In this paper, we answer this question positively. Generally speaking, linear cryptanalysis exploits specific correlations
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Wen-Long Sun and Jie Guan  between the input and the output of cryptographic primitives. For almost any cryptographic scheme, each output bit can be described by a multivariate polynomial over GF (2) in both the public variables and the secret variables. As we know, a very powerful tool to recover the secret variables is cube attacks, proposed by [14] . To derive the secret information, the attacker sums this bit over all possible values of a subset of the public variables. The summations are used to derive linear equations in the secret variables, which can be efficiently solved. When launching linear attacks, we can, in specific scenarios, obtain the explicit description of a multivariate polynomial. Since the polynomial's probability is less than one after one or several approximations in linear attacks, we have to adapt our use of cube attacks in such cases because they are used only on such polynomials when the polynomial's probability is equal to one.
Here, we combine cube attacks with linear attacks to propose a novel method called cube-linear attack, aiming to recover the secret variables of a probabilistic multivariate polynomial. It uses information that both cube attacks and linear attacks use. Once the secret variables have been recovered, the degree of non-linear monomials involving the recovered bits would decrease and may even fall to zero. This is the same result as desired by linear attacks. Subsequent cryptanalysis results prove our method to be efficient.
In addition to the two combination scenarios (using linear attacks during a cube attack and using cube attacks during a linear attack), two schemes, A and B, are discussed. The data complexity and success rate of each scheme can be calculated only when all the derived polynomials [14] defined by any determined cube index are independent. Otherwise, the situations are too complex to give any concrete computational formula using the existing theories. An introduction to the detailed theory of our method is given in Section III. Afterwards, an improved linear cryptanalysis is proposed using the cube-linear attack as a novel technique. As an application, we cryptanalyze the security of the eSTREAM finalist, Trivium, against linear cryptanalysis. Three linear approximations with the same average bias, 2 -23. 2 , are found, and four key bits are recovered for the reduced version of Trivium with the initialization of 288 rounds (out of 1,152). The data complexity is 2 47.2 IVs with 97.8% success rate, improving upon previous linear cryptanalysis results. Although a few better cryptanalysis results on Trivium have been published using other attacks ( [14] , [15] , and [16] ), it's confirmed that our method is meaningful from the point of view of improving linear cryptanalysis.
For convenience, we particularly follow the relevant concepts and terminology of cube attacks. Although based on the same essence of higher-order differential cryptanalysis, there are some differences between cube attacks and our cubelinear attack. Firstly, cube attacks are applied to such a polynomial having probability one, while our method copes with probabilistic polynomials. Secondly, the primary cost of cube attacks lies in the searching of the appropriate cube indexes, while our method focuses on an explicit polynomial. Moreover, they are two different methods, and our cube-linear attack is proposed as an improved technique for linear cryptanalysis.
Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly review cube attacks and linear cryptanalysis. Afterwards, we describe the theory of our cube-linear attack and propose an improved linear cryptanalysis (Section III). In Section IV, we apply our method to a specific analysis on Trivium. Finally, we make a few concluding remarks in Section V.
II. Cube Attacks and Linear Cryptanalysis 1. Review of Cube Attacks
Cube attacks [14] , first formalized by I. Dinur and A. Shamir at EUROCRYPT 2009, are a generic type of algebraic attack and can be applied to any cryptosystem, provided that the attacker has access to a bit of information that can be represented by a low-degree multivariate polynomial over GF (2) .
In almost any cryptographic scheme, each output bit, z i , can be described by a multivariate master polynomial over GF (2) comprising public variables v 1 , v 2 , … , v m , which are either bits of the plaintext of a block cipher or bits of the initial vector of a stream cipher and that are dependent upon secret variables x 1 ,
To simplify our notation, the distinction between public and private variables is now ignored. Given a multivariate master polynomial with n variables p(x 1 , … , x n ) over GF (2) in algebraic normal form (ANF) and a term t I containing variables from an index subset I that are multiplied together, the polynomial can be rewritten as the sum of terms that are supersets of I and terms that miss at least one variable from I : p P  mod 2. Cube attacks have two phases. In the first preprocessing phase, the task is to find as many maxterms and corresponding linear superpolys as possible. In the next phase, the online phase, the attacker solves the system of linear equations obtained and acquires some values related to the secret variables.
Review of Linear Cryptanalysis
The basic idea behind linear cryptanalysis is to find some linear approximation to the action of cryptographic primitives. In other words, what the attacker exploits are some statistical correlations between the input and the output. For a cryptosystem with k-bit key 1 2 ( , , , ),
the task of the attacker is to find the index sets I, J, and L such that
holds with probability 1 2 , 0. p      For the block and stream ciphers, linear attacks are usually executed as follows. First, we look for the linear or nonlinear approximations of different rounds, and then we combine them. From this, we can obtain final linear approximations for the whole cryptosystem with probability calculated according to Lemma 1 (piling-up Lemma). Lemma 1 [8] . For each value i,
.
Given a linear approximation, it is possible to determine one bit of information about the key
with the help of Algorithm 1 [8] . The core idea of Algorithm 1 is a maximumlikelihood.
Algorithm 1. Determination of key information.
T : = # of plaintexts (out of N) such that the left side of (1) is equal to 0.
The computational formula of the success rate to recover the key
is as follows [8] and is related to both the data complexity N (the number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs) and the bias :
The main goal of linear cryptanalysis is to find an effective linear approximation. However, thus far, there has been no optimal algorithm to look for such a linear approximation for any cryptosystem. In this paper, we tentatively put forward a novel technique called cube-linear attack, contributing to linear cryptanalysis.
III. Improved Linear Cryptanalysis
Cube-Linear Attack
This subsection provides the basic theory of our cube-linear attack. Generally speaking, linear cryptanalysis exploits specific correlations between the input and output of cryptographic primitives. For almost any cryptographic scheme, each output bit can be described by a multivariate master polynomial over GF (2) in the public variables and the secret variables. When launching linear attacks, we can, in specific scenarios, obtain the explicit description of a multivariate polynomial ( , ) i z p v k  with probability p*. Based on cube attacks, the polynomial ( , )
 for any term t I . We can determine the maxterm t I leading to a linear expression P S(I) , and then the secret variables in the resultant system of polynomial equations can be efficiently solved. Since the polynomial's probability, p*, is less than one after one or several approximations in linear attacks and cube attacks are only used on such polynomials when their probability is equal to one, the actual use of cube attacks in this case means that they first need to be adapted prior to their use. Here, we combine cube attacks with linear attacks to propose a novel method called a cube-linear attack, aiming to recover the secret variables of a probabilistic multivariate polynomial. Based on the aforementioned different ways of combining cube attacks and linear attacks, two schemes, A and B, are discussed under the following attack condition: all derived polynomials defined by any determined maxterm are independent.
A. Description of Scheme A
Scheme A can be considered as the "cube-linear-cube" attack, the name befittingly corresponding to the three steps that it incorporates. The following analysis embodies a more detailed introduction of scheme A. Based on the split polynomial Step 2. Recover K |v in each derived polynomial p |v by Algorithm 1.
Step 3. Sum all the recovered K |v , and then the value Step 1. Determine the maxterm t I .
Step 2. Sum all the derived polynomials p |v , then we have
Step 3. Recover the key information in P S(I) by Algorithm 1.
Corresponding to the above three steps, the first two steps of scheme B are actually the use of the cube attack, and then the key information in P S(I) can be determined with the help of Algorithm 1. 
C. Comments on Schemes A and B
It should be noted that the recovered key information using scheme A is the same as that of scheme B. -where r B is equal to r v depending on the relationship between the data complexity and the bias. If no more plaintext/ciphertext pairs exist, then the success rate of scheme A would be lower than that of scheme B. Table 1 provides some comparisons between schemes A and B at the same level of success rate. It shows that scheme A is in fact more superior in most scenarios because of the following reasons: First of all, since the probability of the derived polynomial could actually be enhanced by increasing a few plaintext/ ciphertext pairs based on the theory of linear cryptanalysis. Taken together, when to choose scheme A or scheme B should depend on the particular situation. Remark 1. For both schemes, the first thing we need to do in practice after determining the maxterm t I is to verify whether the attack condition comes into existence or not. If it is tenable, then we have the above theorems. Otherwise, the situations are too complicated to obtain any concrete results for the data complexity and success rate of the two schemes using the present theory.
Improved Linear Cryptanalysis
For a probabilistic polynomial, it is the secret variables recovered by our cube-linear attack that have never before been exposed by previous linear cryptanalysis. Consequently, it's confirmed that the cube-linear attack indeed provides us with a paradise of improvement in linear cryptanalysis. Overall, the improved linear cryptanalysis could be summarized as follows.
Improved linear cryptanalysis.
When obtaining a polynomial z i = p(v, k) with probability p*:
Step 1. Verify whether the attack condition comes into existence or not, if it is tenable, then go to the next step; Otherwise, our theory won't work. Step 2. Based on Theorems 2, 3, and 4, choose a better scheme (scheme A or B) to recover the key information.
Step 3. Combining the recovered key information, carry on looking for its linear approximation.
As an application, we cryptanalyze the security of the eSTREAM finalist, Trivium, against linear cryptanalysis using our method in the next section.
IV. Improved Linear Cryptanalysis on Trivium
Trivium Stream Cipher
Trivium [17] , a hardware-oriented stream cipher, was designed by C. De Canniѐre and B. Preneel and was selected for the final eSTREAM portfolio [18] . It takes an 80-bit key K and an 80-bit initial value (IV) as input. No output is produced during the first 1,152 rounds. After this initialization phase, the value of z is output as the key stream at each round.
Description of Attack Process
For the 288-round Trivium, we have 
with bias 2 -9 . Since the purpose of the attack is to find a linear approximation in the key, IV and output bits, the linear approximation given above is to be rewritten in terms of s 0 (i), 1, 2, ... , 80, 94, 95, ... , 173. i 
The remaining terms are omitted since they are assigned to constants during the initialization phrase. Now, we have the right equation in (7) (see Appendix A), whereas it should be noted that there is something wrong in the one given by M.S. Turan and O. Kara [5] , which would affect the subsequent results.
Next, we show that there are still some improvements for our purpose when using a cube-linear attack. For the sake of analysis, we denote K monomials and IV monomials the XOR of monomials involving only the key bits and the XOR of monomials involving only the IV bits, respectively and set the XOR of the remaining monomials as (IV·K) monomials . Then, (7) could be written as follows:
  49  63  64  50  62  63  65  50  37  50  64   70  59  71  7  58  6  65  77  64 iv iv i iv (8), it is very easy to split it into the form
and to determine whether there is such an index subset I that leads to a linear expression P S(I) based on the basic idea of cube attacks. Actually, the four index subsets {70}, {71}, {76}, and {77} in (8) are available for recovering k 58 , k 59 , k 64 , and k 65 , respectively. Taking the index subset I = {77} as a case in point, we explain how to recover k 64 using our method.
Step 1. Determine the index subset I = {77} and C I = {iv 77 } accordingly.
Step 2. According to cube attacks, the other public variables could be assigned any values except for those variables belonging to C I . For simplicity, we set iv 25 , iv 26 , iv 31 , iv 32 , iv 49 , and iv 50 to zero. When iv 77 = 0 (that is, iv 25 , iv 26 , iv 31 , iv 32 , iv 49 , iv 50 , iv 70 , iv 71 , iv 76 , and iv 77 all equal zero), we get the following: , where z stands for the XOR of all the known variables in (8) after assigning IV. When iv 77 = 1 (that is, iv 25 , iv 26 , iv 31 , iv 32 , iv 49 , iv 50 , iv 70 , iv 71 , iv 76 are all equal zero, and iv 77 equals one), we get the following:
which holds with a bias of 2 -9 , where z stands for the XOR of all the known variables in (8) after assigning IV. Note that (9) and (10) are independent of each other since the key bit k 64 could be considered as a random variable. According to Theorem 4 and Table 1 , here, we can achieve a lower data complexity using scheme A compared to scheme B at the same level of success rate. Therefore, we can respectively recover K monomials and k 64 + K monomials with a success rate of 99.77% and data complexity of 2 19 IVs according to scheme A.
Step 3. Based on the above analysis, k 64 = (k 64 + K monomials ) + (K monomials ). The success rate to recover k 64 is 99.54% requiring 2 20 IVs. Here, the total success rate 99.54% is approximately calculated as 0.9977 2 since the failure rate (1-0.9977) is so small that (1-0.9977) 2 can be ignored according to Theorem 2.
Similarly, k 58 , k 59 , and k 65 can be recovered correspondingly for the other index subsets {70}, {71}, and {76}. Therefore, we can simultaneously recover the four key bits k 58 Table 2 .
Search for Better Linear Approximations
The above attack provides us with a paradise of improvement in the search for better linear approximations. Since we aren't aware of the actual values of the four key bits recovered and they are dependent upon concrete scenarios, note that all 16 possible values of the four bits now have to be considered. In the following article, we take (k 58 , k 59 , k 64 , k 65 ) = According to (5)- (12), the bias that (12) 
(|IV| is referred to as the size of IV, and in particular, it is 80 bits for Trivium). However, the bias is too small to be used to recover any information about the key. According to the method used in [5] , the magnitude of the bias can be increased when allowed to choose some special key bits and IV bits. Unfortunately, the rules of selection weren't provided, and furthermore, the selected bits in [5] weren't also the best. So, here, Algorithm 2 (see Appendix B) is proposed to choose those special key bits or IV bits.
as the key bit set chosen to zero and the IV bit set chosen to zero, respectively. Then, |Ω K | and |Ω IV | represent the size of Ω K and Ω IV , respectively, and n 1 and n 2 are referred to as the individual quantity of the remaining quadratic and cubic terms, respectively, after Ω K and Ω IV have been determined. The bias of a linear approximation to (11) is calculated as follows:
When given |Ω K | and |Ω IV |, we can make use of Algorithm 2 to choose Ω K and Ω IV . Algorithm 2 takes finding better linear approximations as a criterion, and the main ideas are to select such a bit that can eliminate the most nonlinear monomials when being set to zero. More detailed rules to cope with more complicated scenarios are showed in Algorithm 2. When |Ω K | = 10 and |Ω IV | = 10, for instance, Table 3 provides the two sets Ω K and Ω IV using Algorithm 2.
According to the different Ω K of Table 4 .
Comparison with Previous Results
For the reduced version of 288-round Trivium, M.S. Turan and O. Kara in [5] found a linear approximation with bias of 2 -31 when |Ω K | = 10 and |Ω IV | = 10. In [19] , Jia and others presented a multiple linear cryptanalysis on 288-round Trivium, resulting in another linear approximation with the same bias 2 -31 when |Ω K | = 10 and |Ω IV | = 13. In this paper, we find some linear approximations with bigger bias. Moreover, the additional four key bits are recovered. These results are summarized in Table 5 . Obviously, our attack is better than the previous.
V. Conclusion
In cryptography, linear cryptanalysis is the most basic cryptanalysis approach aiming to look for a linear relation between inputs and outputs. A variety of refinements to the attack have been suggested in the past. In this paper, a novel technique called cube-linear attack is proposed (for the first time) to take a probabilistic polynomial as the attack target and furthermore to mine the secret information that has yet to be exploited by previous linear cryptanalysis methods. It is beneficial to allow for a reduction in the amount of data required for a successful attack in specific circumstances. Applying our method to a specific analysis on Trivium, we get better linear cryptanalysis results. Although a few better cryptanalytic results on Trivium had been published earlier using other attacks, we believe that our method is meaningful from the point of view of improving linear cryptanalysis; furthermore, it could be extended to other ciphers. For example, we have improved the bias of the revised 288-round Trivium algorithms proposed in [20] and [21] by 2  14 and 2   4 , respectively. Therefore, our method is worth considering in launching linear attacks on a cryptosystem.
